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Abstract 
In order to develop a system with high safety, it is necessary to determine countermeasures for hazards that 
extracted using analysis methods like HAZOP, FTA, and so on. Furthermore, it is necessary to able to explain that 
countermeasures are surely embedded into a developed system in order to be accepted the analysis result by 
stakeholders. 
In this paper, we discuss the effectiveness of the knowledge to apply D-Case for a safety analysis result that 
includes hazards extracted by HAZOP, failure modes extracted by FTA and countermeasures for failure modes. 
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1. Introduction  
The car industry has provided products with high quality until now. However, as well as that, it is necessary to 
correspond to the standard as ISO26262 in order to accept accountability to stakeholders from now on. In order to 
achieve ISO26262 compliance, it is necessary to need to prepare not only the result of safety analysis, but also the 
enough explanation for stakeholders. In this paper, we adopt D-Case that provides the argument process for 
explaining claims based on evidences. D-Case is an assurance case for discussing dependability[1][3][5]. We 
propose the effective process combined HAZOP, FTA with D-Case. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 3 explains the safety analysis process adopted in this paper. Section 4 
describe the target system for this experiment and the result of this experiment. Section 5 discusses the effectiveness 
of the result shown in section 4.2. The conclusion of this paper is described in section 6. 
2. Related work 
Reference[1][10][14] proposes knowledge system related to safety or dependability, but it does not provide the 
method of generating D-Case. Reference[3][4][5][6] proposes the notation or patterns related to a safety argument. 
However, it does not describe the relation between HAZOP, FTA and D-Case. Reference[2][7][15] proposes the 
method combined HAZOP or FTA with D-Case, but it does not describe the relation between HAZOP and FTA. 
Reference[8][9] shows the relation of safety analysis methods such as HAZOP, FTA, but it does not show the 
relation with D-Case. Reference[11][12] proposes the method of generating safety case, but it does not describe 
concrete analysis methods such as HAZOP. Reference[13] proposes the method of generating D-Case based on 
Context Dependency Matrix. However, it does not consider about HAZOP and FTA. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take form the method to integrate HAZOP, FTA, and D-Case, to confirm its 
effectiveness based on an experiment in this paper. 
3. Adopted safety analysis process 
The safety analysis process adopted in this paper is shown below [8][9][10][11][14]. Details of this process are 
shown on the following section. 
 
(1) Hazards are extracted in point of outside view of system using HAZOP. 
(2) Failure modes for each hazard are extracted using FTA, and then countermeasures are defined. 
(3) The status of embedded countermeasures into the system is confirmed using D-Case. 
 
In addition, we adopt simplified analysis methods in this paper, because we need to focus the effectiveness 
evaluation of D-Case on a safety analysis process. 
3.1. Extraction of hazards 
In this process, we extract hazards as deviation from normal behavior of the system, using HAZOP in the view of 
outside. Because it can extract hazards by combining design parameters of the system with guide-words such as 
“No”, “Reverse” [15]. Concrete actions are below. 
 
(1) Select adequate guidewords according to design parameters of the system. 
(2) Extract hazards by combining design parameters with guidewords. 
 
And extracted hazard is used as top event of FTA on next step.  
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3.2. Extraction of failure modes and definition of countermeasures 
In this process, we extract failure modes for each hazard, using FTA in the view of inside. It can extract failure 
modes by decomposing a hazard according to a design structure. And then, we define necessary countermeasures for 
failure modes. Concrete actions are below. 
 
(1) Set extracted hazard as the top-event of FTA. 
(2) Decompose the top-event to sub-event, according to a design structure such as a system structure chart. 
(3) Extract failure modes by combining the minimum sub-event with guide-words such as “No”, “Reverse”. 
(4) Define countermeasures to avoid failure modes. 
  
In addition, if a countermeasure for a failure mode needs to embed into some devices, it is necessary to declare 
the common safety principle. Also, on actual development project, the analysis method combined FTA with FMEA 
is better on accuracy for the safety analysis result. However, we adopt the simplified methods mentioned above, 
because we focus the effectiveness of explanation using D-Case. 
3.3. Confirmation of countermeasures for failure modes 
In this process, we prepare D-Case as the explanation document in order to be able to confirm the safety of the 
system by stakeholders. Concretely, we visualize the following three points needed by stakeholders to accept the 
document. 
 
(1) The extraction result of failure modes is reasonable. 
(2) The countermeasures for failure modes are reasonable. 
(3) The embedded status of the countermeasures for failure modes is reasonable. 
 
Regarding (1), we show the process flow of extracting failure modes using strategy node of D-Case, and the 
criteria of analysis using context node. Regarding (2), we show the criteria of definition of countermeasures using 
context node. Regarding (3), we show the status of embedded countermeasures with the correspondence relation of 
countermeasures shown using context node and confirmation records of embedded countermeasures shown using 
evidence node. 
4. Experiment 
4.1. Target system 
This section explains Headlight Control System used for this experiment. In addition, following points are 
omitted, because we need to focus the effectiveness evaluation of D-Case on a safety analysis process. 
• Hardware details of devices (sensor, actuator, ECU) 
• Software structure of Body Control ECU 
• Software component details embedded on ECU 
4.1.1. Headlight Control System 
Table 1 shows the functions provided by Headlight Control System. Fig.1 shows the relation among devices 
(sensor, actuator, ECU) as system structure. 
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 Table 1. List of function. 
ID. Function 
1. Headlights are “turned on” with user operation 
2. Headlights are “turned off” with user operation 
 
 
Fig. 1. System structure. 
4.1.2. Headlight Control ECU 
Fig.2 shows the ECU software structure embedded on Headlight Control ECU. 
 
 
Fig. 2. ECU software structure. 
4.2. The result of experiment 
This section explains the result of analysis and confirmation about safety of Headlight Control System in section 
4.1, using the safety analysis process in section 3. 
4.2.1. Extraction of hazards 
We selected following guidewords of HAZOP: “No”, “Reverse”, “More”, “Less”, according to the values of 
headlight feature: “turn on”, “turn off”. Table 2 shows the result of HAZOP for the function in table 1, using above 
guidewords. In addition, we adopt only ID.1 from next process. 
Table 2. Hazard analysis result 
ID. Guideword Hazard 
1. No Total loss of headlight 
2. Reverse Reverse “turn on”, “turn Off” to user operation 
3. More A lot of quantity of light 
4. Less Lack of quantity of light 
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4.2.2. Extraction of failure modes and definition of countermeasures 
Fig.3 shows the analysis result of FTA extracted failure modes according to the system structure, when the top 
event is ID.1 of Table 2. Basic events of FTA tree corresponding to failure modes are extracted using same 
guideword as Table 2. Table 3 shows countermeasures based on safety countermeasure policy below, for extracted 
failure modes. 
 
[Safety countermeasure policy] 
• (Policy 1): To avoid sudden headlight loss while the vehicle is moving, if failure related with headlight control is 
detected, Control in “turn on” side. 
• (Policy 2): If loss or error of communication is detected, Control based on (Policy 1) by only receiver side. 
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Fig. 3. Analysis result of failure modes using FTA. 
 
Table 3. Countermeasures for failure modes analysis result (for only ECUs) . 
ID. Device Failure mode Countermeasure 
1. Body Control ECU Wire harness disconnect of IG switch value Let the value ON by H/W circuit 
2. Inverse value of IG switch by noise Prevent chatting IG switch value at IO-Stack 
3. Body control ECU H/W failure Embedded on Headlight Control ECU 
4. CAN bus disconnect Same as above 
5. CAN message transmission fault by noise Same as above 
6. CAN message corruption by noise Add incorrect detection signal at COM-Stack 
7. Headlight Control 
ECU 
CAN bus disconnect Let IG switch value ON at COM-Stack 
8. CAN message reception fault by noise Same as above 
9. CAN message corruption by noise When incorrect detected, let IG switch value 
ON at COM-Stack. 
10. Wire harness disconnect of Light switch value Let the value ON by H/W circuit 
11. Inverse value of Light switch by noise Prevent chatting Light switch value at IO-
Stack  
12. Headlight control ECU H/W failure Other systems monitor failure and record 
diagnosis data. 
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13. Wire harness disconnect of right headlight value Embedded on right headlight side. 
14. Right headlight value masquerade by noise Same as above 
15. Wire harness disconnect of left headlight value Embedded on left headlight side. 
16. Left headlight value masquerade by noise Same as above 
 
4.2.3. Confirmation of the countermeasure for failure modes 
We define “Headlight Control System is safe” as the top goal of D-Case, and structure the explanation of this 
experiment result according to the following order. 
 
(1) Hazard extraction result of functions provided by system 
(2) Classification of devices of which the system is composed 
(3) Failure mode extraction result of each device 
(4) Countermeasure location for failure modes 
 
Furthermore, above item (4) connects with the countermeasure for failure mode as the criteria satisfied by a work 
product, using context node of D-Case. This way makes it possible to confirm that countermeasures for failure mode 
are embedded into system surely.  This D-Case is shown in Fig.4 and Fig.5. Fig.5 shows the content of M2 within 
Fig.4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Description of safety analysis result (Top view). 
914   Nobuhide Kobayashi and Shuichiro Yamamoto /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  908 – 917 
 
Fig. 5. Description of safety analysis result (the part of ECUs). 
4.2.4. Effort of Experiment 
Table 4 shows details of effort in this experiment on the assumption below.  
• The engineer who has no experience of HAZOP, FTA, and D-Case experiments. 
• There are no incompleteness and lack in target system information in section 4.1. 
 
Table 4. The effort result of experiment. 
Category Work item Effort 
Preparation Learn HAZOP 5.0h 21.0h 
Learn FTA 8.0h  
Learn D-Case 8.0h  
Analysis and 
Confirm 
(Initial version) 
Check in target system 0.5h 7.5h 
Extract hazards (using HAZOP) 0.5h  
Extract failure modes (using FTA) 2.0h  
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Define countermeasures 1.5h  
Confirm the result of countermeasures (using D-Case) 3.0h  
Rework Revision 2 (Revising from Extract hazards) 7.0h 11.0h 
Revision 3 (Revising from Confirm the result of countermeasures) 4.0h  
Review  3.0h 3.0h 
Total effort   42.5h 
 
5. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of D-Case, limitation of this process, Introduction effort for actual 
development project. 
5.1. Visualization of safety analysis overview 
An overhead view of safety analysis procedure is necessary to let stakeholders understand safety of system. In 
this experiment, the safety analysis is executed in order of hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, and definition of 
countermeasure. Stakeholders can get the overhead view of safety analysis procedure using hierarchy structure of D-
Case defined according to this process order. Also, D-Case can visualize judgment criteria like analysis policy and 
guideword. Thus we conclude that D-Case is effective as an overhead view for stakeholders [2][6][7]. 
5.2. Visualization descriptive quality of safety countermeasures policy 
It is necessary to define the safety countermeasure policy in feasible scope in order to ensure consistency of 
system element behavior [12][13]. For example in the case when C1 of Fig.6 is top policy, if countermeasures are 
defined according the policy of this level of abstraction, inconsistency of countermeasures may be caused by 
different interpretation for each system element, and as a result, it may cause not be able ensure safety of the whole 
system. Using the safety analysis result structured by D-Case, it is possible to confirm easily whether the policy like 
C2 derived from C1 is expressed without contradiction to other policy and located in feasible scope. Thus, we 
conclude that this method is effective to judge descriptive quality of safety countermeasure policy. 
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Fig. 6. Visualization descriptive quality of safety countermeasures policy. 
5.3. Visualization embedded status of countermeasures 
For defining D-Case, we link context nodes to countermeasures, and link evidence nodes to confirmation record 
satisfied with countermeasures, according to (3) of section 3.3. As a result, we can confirm that completed D-Case 
can show the embedded status of countermeasures with only the relation of the above mentioned two nodes. 
On actual development, countermeasures are embedded to a system through many design process since first 
edition is defined. And the purpose of traceability matrix is to record the process history in design viewpoint. 
Therefore, traceability matrix may not provide a suitable view for confirming with viewpoint of safety analysis. On 
the other hand, when D-Case is used as view, as it is mentioned in section 5.1, it can visualize all process flow (from 
Extract hazards to Define countermeasures). Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is easy to confirm relations 
between countermeasures and embedded status of countermeasures, although it is difficult in only FTA notation. 
Thus, we conclude that D-Case is effective as view for confirming by stakeholders[4]. 
5.4. Limitation 
To introduce this process for actual development project, it is necessary to add several other safety analyses such 
as FMEA, to analyze the importance of failure modes in order to define sufficient countermeasures.  
5.5. Introduction effort 
The rework effort of Table.4 is mostly used for revising the structure of FTA and D-Case. Therefore, we predict 
that rework effort can be reduced substantially using templates of FTA and D-Case derived from this experiment, 
when it is a system structure like this target system. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed the process combined HAZOP, FTA with D-Case, and confirmed the effectiveness 
based on the experiment shown in Section 4. And we showed that D-Case was effective as the explanation 
document when stakeholders confirmed the safety analysis result, because it was possible to show an overhead view, 
to visualize criteria for each activity of this process, and to show an embedded status of countermeasures for a target 
system. 
Future work includes the following studies. 
• Proposal of the method for generating represent in natural language statement from D-Case, because many 
stakeholders have no knowledge of D-Case. 
• Confirmation the effectiveness of this proposal based on an experiment. 
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